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Summary: There is substantial agreement among scientists that the variability of a person's blood- to breath-
alcohol ratio contributes significantly to the experimental error in results from breath-alcohol analysis. Some
have argued that the need to correct for this source of error can be eliminated by reporting breath test results
in units of breath-alcohol concentration rather than blood-alcohol concentration. A simple mathematical proof
is presented to demonstrate that this is not the case. Moreover, the scientific and legal flaws of this argument
are discussed, and recommendations are offered for dealing with the problems that have developed from
adoption of this view.
Introduction
In 1990, Labianca (1) detailed the chemical basis of the
operation of the Breathalyzer. That instrument — and
other breath-alcohol analyzers currently used in law en-
forcement — employs a constant blood- to breath-alco-
hol ratio (hereinafter termed, "blood/breath ratio") to
convert the breath-alcohol concentration of a Driving-
While-Intoxicated (DWI) suspect into his/her corre-
sponding blood-alcohol concentration. The problem
with this type of conversion, as emphasized by Labianca
(1) and others, including Simpson (2, 3), is that it fails to
take into account substantial inter- and intra-individual
variations in blood/breath ratios.
For many years, scientists have been acutely aware of
the uncertainty associated with data generated from the
uniform application of a constant blood/breath ratio to
breath test subjects. In this regard, Mason and Dubowski
(4, 5) recommended in the 1970s that breath- to blood-
alcohol concentration conversions be abandoned, and
that the offense of driving-while-intoxicated be statuto-
rily defined in terms of specified limits of breath- rather
than blood-alcohol concentration in jurisdictions em-
ploying breath-alcohol analysis. That recommendation
— which was subsequently endorsed by others, includ-
ing Jones (6) in 1978 — was further emphasized by Du-
bowski in 1983 (7), when he stressed that the proposal
"simply recognizes the wide variability of the physiolog-
ical blood/breath ratio." The apparent simplicity and
problem-free nature of this recommendation has led to
its adoption by the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration (NHTSA) of the US Department of Trans-
portation, and has prompted a number of states in the
USA during the last decade to adopt the recommenda-
tion as well and enact direct breath-alcohol statutes.
Other states currently considering the recommendation
may also follow suit.
The enactment of direct breath-alcohol statutes, how-
ever, has not eliminated the need to correct for the ex-
perimental error stemming from the conversion of
breath- into blood-alcohol concentration via multiplica-
tion of the former by a constant blood/breath ratio. In
fact, the enactment of such statutes has, in at least one
case, resulted in the legislation of incorrect science.
Using an elementary mathematical analysis, this article
focuses on the scientific reasons why direct breath stat-
Eur J Clin Chem Clio Bioehem 1995; 33 (No 12)
920 Labianca and Simpson: Medicolegal alcohol determination: variability of the blood/breath ratio
utes are not acceptable and also proposes the means by
which the problems created by such statutes can be rem-
edied.
Scientific and Legal Overview
The first demonstration of the incorrect science embod-
ied in a particular breath-alcohol concentration statute,
namely the California statute, was documented by Simp-
son (8). He showed that, implicit in the statute, is an
equation that incorrectly describes the relationship be-
tween blood- and breath-alcohol concentration in a hu-
man subject. The California statute criminalizes driving
with 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in blood (0.8
g/1 blood), and permits 0.08% by weight to be estab-
lished by either 0.08 g/100 ml blood (blood-alcohol con-
centration) - that is, 0.8 g/1 blood - or 0.08g/2101
breath (breath-alcohol concentration), which is 0.00038
g/1 breath. If, however, 0.08 g/100 ml blood (0.8 g/1
blood) =0.08% by weight, and 0.08 g/2101 breath
(0.00038 g/1 breath) = 0.08% by weight, then it neces-
sarily follows that 0.08 g/100 ml blood (0.8 g/1 blood)
= 0.08g/2101 breath (0.00038 g/1 breath), and that
blood-alcohol concentration equals breath-alcohol con-
centration. The California legislature thus put into law
the relationship, blood-alcohol concentration (BAG)
equals breath-alcohol concentration (BrAC), which is
incorrect. In fact, BAG °c BrAC, so that, at a given
temperature, the correct relationship describing the
partitioning of alcohol between a test subject's blood
and breath is given by equation 1.
BACAct = R X BrACMeas. (Eq. 1)
In this equation, BACAct. is the actual blood-alcohol
concentration that would correspond to the result of a
direct analysis of the subject's blood if he/she opted
for such an analysis; BrACMeas. is the measured
breath-alcohol concentration that would characterize
the subject if he/she opted for a breath test instead;
and R is the subject's blood/breath ratio at the time
of the breath test.
In contrast to California are those jurisdictions that have
enacted statutes defining driving-while-intoxicated in
terms of blood-alcohol concentration and a coexisting
breath-alcohol concentration, the former serving as the
basis for the evaluation of driving-while-intoxicated sus-
pects unable, or unwilling, to undergo a breath test.
While these statutes do not contain the incorrect rela-
tionship, blood-alcohol concentration equals breath-al-
cohol concentration, they embody other scientific and
legal flaws. These stem from the fact that, a specific
breath-alcohol concentration limit is probative // and
only //there is sufficient ethanol in the blood to produce
the state of intoxication defined by the breath-alcohol
concentration limit. That condition must be met, for it is
possible to obtain a breath-alcohol concentration result
equal to, or in excess of, a statutory limit when there is
little or no ethanol in the blood. This can occur, for ex-
ample, if a test subject's breath is contaminated by
mouth alcohol (9, 10) and/or by a compound capable of
producing a false ethanol reading on a breath analyzer
(11, 12). Direct breath-alcohol concentration statutes,
therefore, merely assume that, in all cases, there is suffi-
cient ethanol in the blood to produce breath-alcohol con-
centration results indicative of driving-while-intoxi-
cated. Thus, these statutes, in conjunction with the direct
blood-alcohol concentration statutes that they must nec-
essarily coexist with, "lock into place" equation 2,
where k, in contrast to R, is the assumed blood/breath
ratio for all test subjects.
BACAct. = k X BrACMeas.
Scientific and Legal Flaws
(Eq. 2)
In the context of specific statutory limits in the USA,
BACAct. and BrACMeas. are typically defined in terms of
the same weight of alcohol in two different phases —
for example, 0.10 g/\ 00 ml blood (1.0 g/1 blood, liquid
phase) and 0.10 g/2101 breath (0.00048 g/1 breath, gas
phase). The latter concentration is equal to 48 g/l O
ml breath, which reflects the concentration unit used in
some European jurisdictions (13, 14)1). Under these
circumstances, k must equal 2100. A constant blood/
breath ratio, therefore, is applied to all drivers and is
used by a legislature to set a breath-alcohol concentra-
tion limit when equation 2, with k = 2100, is solved for
BrACMeas., as expressed by equation 3.
BAGAct. X
1
2100
= BrACMeas. (Eq.3)
A statute that establishes a specific breath-alcohol con-
centration limit in this way does not solve the problem
of blood/breath ratio variability that Dubowski (4, 5, 7)
and Jones (6) sought to eliminate. It simply ignores that
variability, which is the essence of its scientific flaw.
Moreover, since the statute operates under the assump-
tion that any driving-while-intoxicated suspect who un-
dergoes a breath test is characterized by a 2100: 1
blood/breath ratio, it is also legally flawed; if the statute
does "greatly enhance the investigation and disposition
of [driving-while-intoxicated] charges", as claimed by
Dubowski (7), it does so by inappropriately relieving the
') International scientific bodies, however, recommend use of SI
units: 0.8 g/1 =17.4 mmol/1; conversion factor: g/l X21.71
= mmol/1.
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prosecution of its burden to establish that the defendant
had a blood/breath ratio of 2100 : 1 or more at the time
of the breath test. That is, this assumption precisely fits
the definition of a presumption, which is a legal infer-
ence of the existence or truth of a fact for which there
is not direct evidence, but which is determined by infer-
ence from the existence of a foundational fact (15).
Thus, for breath-alcohol concentration statutes, the foun-
dational fact is the existing blood-alcohol concentration
limit used for blood tests, and from this, a breath-alcohol
concentration limit is inferred by assuming the existence
of a constant blood/breath ratio, namely 2100 : 1, to re-
late the two via equation 3. A critical point, however, is
that, when used to construct statutes or to establish facts
in criminal cases, a presumption must be rebuttable. Be-
cause a presumed fact may not be correct in a given
case, due process guarantees of the 14th Amendment of
the US Constitution require that the defendant be al-
lowed to rebut that presumption. That certainly would
be the situation if, for example, the presumption of a
2100 : 1 blood/breath ratio were to be applied to a driver
characterized by a 1600 : 1 blood/breath ratio instead of
a 2100 : 1 ratio at the time of his/her breath test. Assum-
ing no other sources of error, this would result in an
overestimate of actual blood-alcohol concentration by
31%, which is equivalent to stating that actual blood-
alcohol concentration would be about 24% less than the
blood-alcohol concentration derived from breath-alco-
hol analysis.
How can this situation be remedied, given that a breath
analyzer cannot adjust for the variability of each test
subject's blood/breath ratio and, therefore, cannot func-
tion on the basis of equation 1 ? The answer is provided
below within the context of a straightforward mathemat-
ical analysis.
The Role of the Multiplication Property
of Equality
Consider that, for many years, the analytical method
used by law enforcement agencies in the USA and else-
where to determine a driving-while-intoxicated suspect's
blood-alcohol concentration has involved the determina-
tion of the suspect's BrACMeas. (g/100 ml breath or g/1
breath) and its conversion into the corresponding esti-
mated blood-alcohol concentration (BACEst.) (g/100 ml
blood or g/1 blood) via equation 4.
BACEst. =* 2100 X BrACMeas. (Eq.4)
other sources of error exist. Furthermore, it should be
noted that, for blood-alcohol concentration statutes
based on breath testing and, therefore, relying on equa-
tion 4, the foundational fact is BrACMcas., and the exis-
tence of a 2100 : 1 blood/breath ratio is assumed to ob-
tain the presumed fact, BACEst.·
Obviously, when the driving-while-intoxicated suspect's
ratio differs from 2100 : 1, equation 4 becomes an incor-
rect indicator of his/her actual blood-alcohol concentra-
tion and must be transformed into the equivalent of
equation 1 to correct for the error arising from the sus-
pect's blood/breath ratio. Given the construction of cur-
rent blood-alcohol concentration statutes involving
breath testing and consistent with equation 4, a practical
way to effect this transformation is to multiply both
sides of equation 4 by the dimensionless correction
factor, R/2100, to give equation 5.
R R
X BACEst. = 2100 X BrACMeas. X :^ (Eq. 5)2100 2100
BAGAct. BrACcor.
This equation is clearly a specific application of equa-
tion 2 and, ih fact, dictates that BACEst. = BACAct.
when the 2100 : 1 ratio is the actual blood/breath ratio
of the suspect at the time of his/her breath test, and no
This operation is in accord with the application of the
elementary mathematical axiom, the multiplication
property of equality (16), to equation 4. This procedure,
which has been described elsewhere (17), necessarily
dictates that both sides of equation 4 must be multiplied
by the same non-zero quantity if the equality reflected
by the equation is to be retained and an equivalent equa-
tion is to be produced. Equation 5, clearly the equivalent
of equation 1, relates BACAct to the corrected breath-
alcohol concentration (BrACcor.)·
Since the variability of the blood/breath ratio generates
errors in values of BACEst. provided by equation 4, a
point explicitly acknowledged by Ditbowski (4, 5, 7) and
Jones (6, 18), equation 5 provides an acceptable method
of dealing with those errors, which can be substantial
and, therefore, detrimental to defendants in driving-
while-intoxicated cases (2, 3, 19, 20). While it is pos-
sible to determine R for each individual at the time of a
breath test, it is not practical. Consequently, to make
corrections in BACEsi. according to equation 5, the only
approach at present is to use population data for blood/
breath ratios corresponding to appropriate confidence
limits. As recently stated by Rainey (21), who relied on
lognormal-transformed data, mean ± 2.58 SD (99%
confidence limits) is the appropriate confidence interval
for conversions of body-fluid alcohol concentrations
when a standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is re-
quired. The same correction can be applied to values of
BACEst. when multiplying them by R/2100 by setting R
equal to "mean - 2.58 SD". This "mean" would corre-
spond to the lognormal-transformed mean blood/breath
Eur J Clin Chem Clin Biochem 1995; 33 (No 12)
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ratio derived from population data associated either with
the absorptive or postabsorptive states of alcohol con-
sumption (2, 3, 19-20).
For some reason, Dubowski and Jones chose not to en-
dorse this use of corrected blood-alcohol concentration
results for breath resting. Instead they claimed that re-
porting breath test results in terms of breath-alcohol con-
centration would eliminate use of the 2100 : 1 ratio and,
therefore, the necessity for correction. In other words,
by claiming there is no need to correct breath-alcohol
concentration results, Dubowski and Jones concluded
that, BrACMeas. = BrACCor.· The latter equation, how-
ever, can only be derived by violating the multiplication
property of equality. That is, for example, when both
sides of equation 5 are multiplied by the reciprocal of
the 2100: 1 ratio, in accord with the multiplication
property of equality, equation 6 is obtained, demonstrat-
ing unequivocally that BrACMeas. BrACCor.5 except as
noted below.
BACAct. X
"l
2100 = BrACMeas.
R
21ÖÖ
(Eq. 6)
Notice that equation 6 requires that BrACMeas. be
multiplied by R/2100 to yield BrACCor., just as a driv-
ing-while-intoxicated defendant is permitted to multiply
BACEst. by R/2100 to obtain BACAct. in order to correct
breath test results reported in terms of blood-alcohol
concentration.2) Notice too the sole condition under
which equation 6 becomes identical to equation 3 and
is, therefore, consistent with "locked-into-place" equa-
2
 One of the reasons for adopting a recommendation that violates
multiplication property of equality is the following: by expressing
breath-alcohol concentration results in the USA in units of g/210 l
breath, manufacturers can supply identical breath-alcohol analyzers
nationwide. This eliminates the need for different models in
"breath-alcohol concentration and blood-alcohol concentration jur-
isdictions" as long as the concentration units do not have to be
recorded on the evidence card, i. e., as long as only the numerical
value is reported. However, the fact that the same breath-alcohol
analyzers calibrated in the same way can now be used in both
"breath-alcohol concentration and blood-alcohol concentration jur-
isdictions" is a clue that nothing is really changed by enacting
direct breath-alcohol concentration statutes. Is there really any sub-
stantive difference between a legislature requiring that breath-alco-
hol analyzers use 2100 to convert measured breath-alcohol concen-
tration results to blood-alcohol concentrations, and a legislature
that uses 2100 to convert an existing blood-alcohol concentration
limit to a breath-alcohol concentration limit? In the former case,
the equation, BrAC X 2100 = BAG, is used to convert a breath
test result into a corresponding blood-alcohol concentration result;
in the latter case, the same equation - in the form, BrAC = BAG/
2100 - is used to set a statutory limit for breath-alcohol concentra-
tion, and measured breath-alcohol concentrations are compared to
this new limit. The two approaches are, in fact, equivalent, as
shown by use of the same equation, but the latter approach creates
legal difficulties that appear to violate due process guarantees in
the US Constitution.
tion 2: only when a subject's blood/breath ratio at the
time of his/her breath test is 2100: 1. The difficulties
created by Dubowski and Jones9 claim, therefore, arise
from an elementary error, namely inappropriate use of
equation 3. While this equation correctly describes the
relationship between BACAct, and BrACMeas. in the spe-
cial case where k = 2100, it has 'been, and still is being
used as though it is correct for all cases in which a
breath test is employed.
An Illustrative Case History
The significance of equation 6 can be further gleaned from its ap-
plication to an actual case described by Simpson (8). The case in-
volved a severely asthmatic defendant charged with driving-while
intoxicated in California prior to that state's adoption of its present
breath-alcohol concentration statute. The charge was based on a
BACEst. of 0.09g/100 ml blood (0.9 g/l blood). (Recall that the
statutory blood-alcohol concentration limit in California is 0.08 g/
100 ml blood [0.8 g/l blood]). The defendant presented evidence
at his trial - stemming from controlled sampling of bloodr and
breath-alcohol conducted at some point in time after he was
charged — that showed a post-peak blood/breath ratio of 1233 : 1
and that resulted in an eventual dismissal of the case. He argued
that this blood/breath ratio was substantially below 2100 : 1 at the
time of his breath test, and that his BACAct. (BAC&t. X R/2100,
according to equation 5) was 0.05 g/l00 ml blood (0.5 g/l blood,
obtained from, 0.9 g/l blood X 1233/2100). Had this defendant
been charged under California's current direct breath statute —
which, as noted above, criminalizes breath-alcohol concentration
results at, or in excess of, 0.08 g/2101 breath (0.00038 g/l breath)
- his BrACMeas. would have been 0.09 g/2101 breath (0.00043 g/l
breath). He would not have been permitted to use equation 6 to
convert this result into a BrACCor. of 0.05 g/210 l breath (0.00024
g/l breath) because, under the current statute, evidence of a defen-
dant's blood/breath ratio has been ruled irrelevant.
The data and circumstances of this case are certainly not unique.
J. C Russell & R. L Jones (22), for example, in their study of
subjects with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease — which in-
cludes conditions such as emphysema and asthma (23) - con-
cluded that, "quantitative measurement [involving breath-alcohol
analysis] must be approached with caution" when test subjects lack
effective pulmonary function. In addition, Giguiere & Simpson
(20) demonstrated that a blood/breath ratio of 1233 : 1, which was
exhibited by the asthmatic defendant in the above case, could also
characterize an otherwise healthy subject absorbing alcohol into
the circulation of the time of a breath test and faced with the same
charge as that defendant. In this regard, even Mason & Dubowski
(4) said, "... when blood and breath tests are available to a subject,
the breath test can be discriminatory in yielding a higher result
than a blood test during absorption." So for this "healthy" subject,
B AC
 Act. would be 0.05 g/l 00 ml blood (0.5 g/l blood) If he were
to undergo a direct blood-alcohol analysis at the time his blood/
breath ratio was 1233 : 1, and he would not be classified driving-
while-intoxicated in California. If, on the other hand, he were to
submit to a breath test, the result, as expected, would be 0.09 g/
2101 breath (0.00043 g/l breath), and he would be classified driv-
ing-while-intoxicated. Guilt or innocence, therefore, would depend
on which test was used to evaluate the subject; while this can be
true even when breath test results are reported in terms of blood-
alcohol concentration, at least there is an opportunity to challenge
the presumption of a 2100 :1 blood/breath ratio under those cb>
cumstances. Both of these examples reinforce the argument offered
previously: enactment of direct breath statutes does not solve the
problem of blood/breath ratio variability; instead, the problem is
simply ignored. "
Eur J Clin Chem Clin Biochem 1995; 33 (No 12)
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Constitutional Considerations and Corrections
for Blood/Breath Ratio Variability
From a legal standpoint, a legislature's use of equation
3 to set a statutory breath-alcohol concentration limit, as
described above, is tantamount to instructing jurors that
they are required to presume or infer that the defendant's
blood/breath ratio was 2100 : 1, or greater, when he/she
was tested, and that the defendant is not permitted to
rebut this presumption in any way. Obviously, in a situa-
tion such as this, the asthmatic defendant in the case
described above would have been unjustly convicted of
driving-while-intoxicated. It is thus important that a de-
fendant be permitted to rebut the assumption that his/
her blood/breath ratio was 2100: 1, or greater, at the
time of the breath test. Moreover, as noted previously,
the use of such an irrebuttable presumption to establish
an element of a criminal offense, or to criminalize cer-
tain behavior by statute, is not permitted under the due
process clause of the 14th Amendment of the US Consti-
tution; consequently, direct breath statutes, as currently
formulated, appear to be unconstitutional.
Under broad police powers (15), legislatures are prob-
ably permitted to satisfy the "rational basis requirement"
for enacting direct breath statutes by determining that it
is dangerous for people to drive with a certain minimum
breath-alcohol concentration, assuming the availability
of sufficient evidence to establish that minimum. Such
evidence, however, does not exist at this time. As
pointed out by Simpson (3, 24), there is at present no
established method or procedure by which alcohol-in-
duced impairment of driving skills can be reliably re-
lated to breath-alcohol concentration; the complexity of
this task is such that there is not even agreement about
what test or combination of tests might be appropriate.
Furthermore, breath analysis experiments that have in-
volved impairment of some of these skills have almost
always employed only postäbsorptive subjects. Conse-
quently, little is known about the relationship between
breath-alcohol concentration and impairment for the
period of time involving the absorption and/or equilibra-
tion-distribution of alcohol, a period of time that is often
significant in forensic applications of breath-alcohol
analysis. Because of this lack of appropriate experimen-
tal results involving impairment, the only means avail-
able to legislatures at present to set a statutory breath-
alcohol concentration limit is to base it on an existing
blood-alcohol concentration limit, and that is what has
been done in a number of cases. There is still a need,
however, to allow for the error in breath test results due
to variability of the blood/breath ratio, and this could be
accomplished by means of equation 6. This would be a
scientifically and legally sound alternative to the posi-
tion taken by Mason & Dubowski (4), namely that a
breath-alcohol concentration corresponding to a statuto-
rily defined blood-alcohol concentration limit "may be
directly calculated by using this [2100 : 1] ratio." But
implementing such a "calculation" would depend on
equation 3 and would, therefore, preclude the use of
equation 6 to correct for the analytical error arising from
the variability of the blood/breath ratio. Similarly, Jones
has also acknowledged that specific blood/breath ratios
have been used to set statutory breath-alcohol concentra-
tion limits both in the USA and elsewhere (18, 25), a
procedure restricted, once again, to the use of equation
3, or a modification of that equation when a ratio
other than 2100 : 1 was involved. (With regard to the
latter point, a blood/breath ratio of 2000 : 1 is used
in Austria, and 2300: 1 in Great Britain and The
Netherlands [18].)
It should be noted that the matter of correcting raw data
obtained from breath-alcohol analyses, in a manner con-
forming to the constitutional guarantees of defendants in
criminal proceedings, has not been entirely ignored by
Dubowski and Jones. Dubowski (26), for example, indi-
cated a subtraction factor of 0.025 g/100 ml blood (0.25
g/1 blood), for 99.7% confidence limits at a BACEst. of
0.10 g/100 ml blood (1.0 g/1 blood). This adjustment re-
presents a 25% correction factor for the variability in the
blood/breath ratio, based on postäbsorptive data ob-
tained by Dubowski (27). If applied to a postäbsorptive
BrACMeas. of 0.10g/2101 breath (0.00048 g/1 breath),
this correction would be equivalent to 0.025 g/2101
breath (0.00012 g/1 breath). Dubowski (26) stated, how-
ever, that such a correction would be unnecessary if a
direct breath-alcohol concentration statute were to be
enacted.
Dubowski (o.e. (26), 18-57; 18-68) also indicated,
apparently on the basis of work reported in 1981 (28),
that a subtraction factor of 0.03g/2101 breath
(0.00014 g/1 breath) at a BrACMeas. of 0.10g/2101
breath (0.00048 g/1 breath) be used to correct for vari-
ability in Breathalyzer 900A test results compared to
corrresponding analyses by gas chromatography. At a
BACEst. of 0.10 g/100 ml blood (1.0 g/1 blood), the
subtraction factor would be 0.03 g/100 ml blood (0.3
g/1 blood). In this case, however, Dnbowski maintained
that, unless other means were adopted, it would be
necessary to take this subtraction factor into account
for every breath test result in order to correct for error
from this source.
Jones (25), on the other hand, suggested that, for
"99.9% confidence [which] gives the defendant an
acceptable margin of safety ... at a critical legal limit,"
a factor of 0.015g/2101 breath (0.00007 g/1 breath)
might be subtracted "from the mean of a duplicate
determination on separate breaths." At a statutory
Eur J Clin Chem Clin Biochem 1995; 33 (No 12)
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breath-alcohol concentration limit of 0.10g/2101
breath (0.00048 g/1 breath), Jones' suggested adjust-
ment would be equivalent to a 15% correction factor.
From work published earlier by Jones (29), however,
a subtraction factor of 26% would apply· for 95%
confidence limits, and about 40% for 99.7% confi-
dence limits, at a mean BACEst. of 0.05 g/100 ml
blood (0.5 g/1 blood). This work involved 506 blood/
breath pairs, breath-alcohol concentration having been
measured with a Breathalyzer 900.
In the final analysis, corrections such as those described
above reinforce the argument that, whenever breath-al-
cohol testing is used to evaluate driving-while-intoxi-
cated suspects, the variability of the blood/breath ratio
cannot be ignored. This is consistent with the view that
legislatures are not permitted to employ an irrebuttable
presumption - that is, effectively mandating an assump-
tion that any driver who has ingested alcohol has a
blood/breath ratio of 2100 : 1 - to construct a direct
breath-alcQhpl statute of the type endorsed by Dubowski
Jones, and, consequently, dependent on equation 3.
If such a device is employed, the resulting statute ap-
pears to violate the due process standard, even if the
rational basis criterion is satisfied. Clearly, any suspect
having an abnormally high breath-alcohol concentration
for the amount of alcohol consumed, such as the asth-
matic described earlier, would ftave his/her due process
rights violated.
Conclusion
The flawed nature of direct breath-alcohol statutes can
be rectified via a return to the statute construction used
previously, whereby use of the 2100 : 1 ratio as applied
to an individual is rebuttable in a court of law. That type
of construction, which is still in place in many jurisdic-
tions in the USA, would be consistent with equation 6.
In fact, statutes so constructed would be acceptable from
both scientific and legal viewpoints and would be appro-
priate replacements for current direct breath statutes,
which are acceptable from neither viewpoint.
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